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Abstract
We introduce a novel framework of Prophet Inequalities for combinatorial valuation func-
tions. For a (non-monotone) submodular objective function over an arbitrary matroid
feasibility constraint, we give an O(1)-competitive algorithm. For a monotone subaddi-
tive objective function over an arbitrary downward-closed feasibility constraint, we give
an O(log n log2 r)-competitive algorithm (where r is the cardinality of the largest feasible
subset).
Inspired by the proof of our subadditive prophet inequality, we also obtain an O(log n ·
log2 r)-competitive algorithm for the Secretary Problem with a monotone subadditive
objective function subject to an arbitrary downward-closed feasibility constraint. Even
for the special case of a cardinality feasibility constraint, our algorithm circumvents an
Ω(
√
n) lower bound by Bateni, Hajiaghayi, and Zadimoghaddam [BHZ13] in a restricted
query model.
En route to our submodular prophet inequality, we prove a technical result of inde-
pendent interest: we show a variant of the Correlation Gap Lemma [CCPV07, ADSY12]
for non-monotone submodular functions.
1 Introduction
The Prophet Inequality and Secretary Problem are classical problems in stopping theory. In
both problems a decision maker must choose one of n items arriving in an online fashion. In
the Prophet Inequality, each item is drawn independently from a known distribution, but the
order of arrival is chosen adversarially. In the Secretary Problem, the decision maker has no
prior information about the set of items to arrive (except their cardinality, n), but the items
are guaranteed to arrive in a uniformly random order.
Historically, there are many parallels between the research of those two problems. The
classic (single item) variants of both problems were resolved a long time ago: in 1963 Dynkin
gave a tight e-competitive algorithm for the Secretary Problem [Dyn63]; a little over a decade
later Krengel and Sucheston [KS77] gave a tight 2-competitive algorithm for the Prophet
Inequality. Motivated in part by applications to mechanism design, multiple-choice variants
of both problems have been widely studied for the past decade in the online algorithms com-
munity. Instead of one item, the decision maker is restricted to selecting a feasible subset of
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the items. The seminal papers of [HKP04, Kle05] introduced a secretary problem subject to
a cardinality constraint (and [Kle05] also obtained a 1−O(1/√r)-competitive algorithm). In
2007, Hajiaghayi et al. followed with a prophet inequality subject to cardinality constraint
[HKS07]. In the same year, Babaioff et al. introduced the famous matroid secretary problem
[BIK07]; in 2012 Kleinberg and Weinberg introduced (and solved!) the analogous matroid
prophet inequality. For general downward-closed constraints, O(log n log r)-competitive algo-
rithms were recently obtained for both the problems [Rub16].
In all the works mentioned in the previous paragraph, the goal is to maximize the sum
of selected items’ values, i.e. an additive objective is optimized. For the secretary problem,
there has also been significant work on optimizing more general, combinatorial objective
functions. A line of great works [BHZ13, FNS11, BUCM12, FZ15] on secretary problem
with submodular valuations culminated with a general reduction by Feldman and Zenklusen
[FZ15] from any submodular function to additive (linear) valuations with only O(1) loss.
Going beyond submodular is an important problem [FI15], but for subadditive objective
functions there is a daunting Ω(
√
n) lower bound on the competitive ratio for restricted value
queries [BHZ13].
Surprisingly, this line of work on combinatorial secretary problems has seen no parallels
in the world of prophet inequalities. In this work we break the ice by introducing a new
framework of combinatorial prophet inequalities.
Combinatorial Prophet Inequalities: Our main conceptual contribution is a general-
ization of the Prophet Inequality setting to combinatorial valuations. Roughly, on each of n
days, the decision maker knows an independent prior distribution over k potential items that
could appear.1 She also has access to a combinatorial (in particular, submodular or monotone
subadditive) function f that describes the value of any subset of the n ·k items (see Section 2
for a formal definition and further discussion). We obtain the following combinatorial prophet
inequalities:
Theorem 1.1 (Submodular Prophet; informal). There exists an efficient randomized O(1)-
competitive algorithm for (non-monotone) submodular prophet over any matroid.
Theorem 1.2 (Monotone Subadditive Prophet; informal). There exists an O(log n · log2 r)-
competitive algorithm for monotone subadditive prophet inequality subject to any downward-
closed constraints family.
Subadditive Secretary Problem: Building on the techniques of our subadditive prophet
inequality, we go back to the secretary world and prove a (computationally inefficient) O(log n·
log2 r)-competitive algorithm for the subadditive secretary problem subject to any downward-
closed feasibility constraint. As noted earlier, this algorithm circumvents the impossibility
result of Bateni et al. [BHZ13] for efficient algorithms2.
Theorem 1.3 (Monotone Subadditive Secretary; informal). There exists an O(log n · log2 r)-
competitive algorithm for monotone subadditive secretaries subject to any downward-closed
constraints family.
1Note that some notion of independence assumption is necessary as even for the single choice problem, if
values are arbitrarily correlated then every online algorithm is Ω(n) competitive [HK92].
2In fact, for general downward-closed constraint, even with additive valuations one should not expect
efficient algorithms with membership queries [Rub16].
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Non-monotone correlation gap: En route to Theorem 1.1, we prove a technical contribu-
tion that is of independent interest: a constant correlation gap for non-monotone submodular
functions. For a monotone submodular function f , [CCPV07] showed that the expected value
of f over any distribution of subsets is at most a constant factor larger than the expectation
over subsets drawn from the product distribution with the same marginals. This bound on
the correlation gap has been very useful in the past decade with applications in optimization
[CVZ14], mechanism design [ADSY12, Yan11, BCK12, BH16], influence in social networks
[RSS15, BPR+16], and recommendation systems [KSS13].
It turns out (see Example 4.1) that when f is non-monotone, the correlation gap is
unbounded, even for n = 2! Instead, we prove a correlation gap for a related function:
fmax(S) , max
T⊆S
f(T ).
(Note that fmax is monotone, but may not be submodular.)
Theorem 1.4 (Non-monotone correlation gap; informal). For any (non-monotone) submod-
ular function f , the function fmax has a correlation gap of O(1).
1.1 Further related work
Secretary Problem In recent years, following the seminal work of Babaioff, Immorlica,
and Kleinebrg [BIK07], there has been extensive work on thematroid secretary problem, where
the objective is to maximize the sum of values of secretaries subject to a matroid constraint.
For general matroids, there has been sequence of improving competitive ratio with the state of
the art being O(log log r) [Lac14, FSZ15]. Obtaining a constant competitive ratio for general
matroids remains a central open problem, but constant bounds are known for many special
cases (see survey by Dinitz [Din13] and references therein). Other variants have also been
considered, such as a hiring that returns for a second (or potentially k-th) interview [Var15],
or secretaries whose order of arrival has exceptionally low entropy [KKN15]. Of special in-
terest to us is a recent paper by Feldman and Izsak [FI15] that considers matroid secretary
problems with general monotone objective functions, parametrized by the supermodular de-
gree. For objective f with supermodular degree D+f and general matroid constraint, they
obtain a competitive ratio of O
(
D+f
3
logD+f +D+f
2
log r
)
. Their results are incomparable
to our Theorem 1.3, but the motivation is related—obtaining secretary algorithms beyond
submodular functions.
Prophet Inequality The connection between multiple-choice prophet inequalities and
mechanism design was recognized in the seminal paper by Hajiaghayi et al. [HKS07]. In
particular, they proved a prophet inequality for uniform matroids; their bound was later im-
proved by Alaei [Ala11]. Chawla et al. further developed the connection between prophet
inequalities and mechanism design, and proved, for general matroids, a variant of the prophet
inequality where the algorithm may choose the order in which the items are viewed. The ma-
troid prophet inequality was first explicitly formulated by Kleinberg and Weinberg [KW12],
who also gave a tight 2-competitive algorithm. In a different direction, Alaei, Hajiaghayi,
and Liaghat [AHL12] considered a variant they call prophet-inequality matching, which is
useful for online ad allocation. More generally, for intersection of a constant number of
matroid, knapsack, and matching constraints, Feldman, Svensson, and Zenklusen [FSZ16]
gave an O(1)-competitive algorithm; this is a corollary of their online contention reslution
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schemes (OCRS), which we also use heavily (see Section 3.1.2). Azar, Kleinberg, and Wein-
berg [AKW14] considered a limited information variant where the algorithm only has access
to samples from each day’s distributions. Esfandiari et al. [EHLM15] considered a mixed
notion of “Prophet Secretary” where the items arrive in a uniformly random order and draw
their values from known independent distributions. Finally, for general downward-closed
constraint, [Rub16] gave O(log n log r)-competitive algorithms for both Prophet Inequality
and Secretary Problem; these algorithms are the basis of our algorithms for the respective
subadditive problems.
Other notions of online submodular optimization Online submodular optimization
has been studied in contexts beyond secretary. In online submodular welfare maximization,
there are m items, n people, and each person has a monotone submodular value function.
Given the value functions, the items are revealed one-by-one and the problem is to immedi-
ately and irrevocably allocate it to a person, while trying to maximize the sum of all the value
functions (welfare). The greedy strategy is already half competitive. Kapralov et al. [KPV13]
showed that for adversarial arrival greedy is the best possible in general (competitive ratio of
1/2), but under a “large capacities” assumption, a primal-dual algorithm can obtain 1− 1/e-
competitive ratio [DHK+13]. For random arrival Korula et al. [KMZ15] showed that greedy
can beat half; obtaining 1− 1/e in this settings remains open.
Buchbinder et al. [BFS15] considered the problem of (monotone) submodular maximiza-
tion with preemption, when the items are revealed in an adversarial order. Since sublinear
competitive ratio is not possible in general with adversarial order, they consider a relaxed
model where we are allowed to drop items (preemption) and give constant-competitive algo-
rithms. Submodular maximization has also been studied in the streaming setting, where we
have space constraints but are again allowed to drop items [BMKK14, CK15, CGQ15].
The “learning community” has looked into experts and bandits settings for submodular
optimization. In these settings, different submodular functions arrive one-by-one and the al-
gorithm, which is trying to minimize/ maximize its value, has to select a set before seeing the
function. The function is then revealed and the algorithm gets the value for the selected set.
The goal is to perform as close as possible to the best fixed set in hindsight. Since submod-
ular minimization can be reduced to convex function minimization using Lova´sz extension,
sublinear regrets are possible [HK12]. For submodular maximization, the usual benchmark is
a 1− 1/e multiplicative loss and an additive regret [SG08, GK10, GKS14].
Interestingly, to the best of our knowledge none of those problems have been studied for
subadditive functions.
1.2 Organization
We begin by defining our model for combinatorial prophet inequalities in Section 2; in Sec-
tion 3 we develop some necessary notation and recall known results; in Section 4 we formalize
and prove our correlation gap for non-monotone submodular functions; and in Section 5 we
prove the submodular prophet inequality.
The subadditive prophet and secretary algorithms share the following high level approach:
use a lemma of Dobzinski [Dob07] to reduce subadditive to XOS objective functions; then solve
the XOS case using the respective (prophet and secretary) algorithms of [Rub16] for additive
objective function and general downward closed feasibility constraint. It turns out that the
secretary case is much simpler since we can use the additive downward-closed algorithm of
[Rub16] as black-box; we present it in Section 6. For the prophet inequality, we have to make
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changes to the already highly non-trivial algorithm of [Rub16] for the additive, downward-
closed case; we defer this proof to Section 7.
2 Combinatorial but Independent Functions
In this section, we define and motivate what we mean by “submodular (or subadditive)
valuations over independent items”. Recall that in the classic prophet inequality, a gambler is
asked to choose one of n independent non-negative random payoffs. In multiple choice prophet
inequalities [HKS07], the gambler chooses multiple payoffs, subject to some known-in-advance
feasibility constraint, and receives their sum. Here, we are interested in the case where the
gambler’s utility is not additive over the outcomes of the random draws: For example, instead
of monetary payoffs, at each time period the gambler can choose to receive a random item,
say a car, and the utility from owning multiple cars diminishes quickly. As another example,
the gambler receives monetary payoffs, but his marginal utility for the one-millionth dollar is
much smaller than for the first. Formally, we define:
Definition 2.1 (C Valuations over Independent Items). Let C be a class of valuation functions
(in particular, we are interested in C ∈ {submodular, monotone subadditive}). Consider:
• n sets U1, . . . , Un and distributions D1, . . . ,Dn, where Di returns a single item from Ui.
• A function f : {0, 1}U → R+, where U ,
⋃n
i=1 Ui and f ∈ C.
• For X ∈∏i Ui and subset S ⊆ [n], let vX(S) , f({Xi : i ∈ S}).
Let D be a distribution over valuation functions v (·) : 2n → R+. We say that D is “C
over independent items” if it can be written as the distribution that first samples X ∼×iDi,
and then outputs valuation function vX(·).
Related notions in the literature
Combinatorial functions over independent items have been considered before. Agrawal et
al. [ADSY12], for example, consider a different, incomparable framework defined via the
generalization of submodular and monotone functions to non-binary, ordered domains (e.g.
f :×Ui → R+ is submodular if f(max{X,Y}) + f(min{X,Y}) ≤ f(X) + f(Y)). In our
definition, per contra, there is no natural way to define a full order over the set of items
potentially available on each time period. For example, if we select an item on Day 1, an item
X2 on Day 2 may have a larger marginal contribution than item Y2, but a lower contribution
if we did not select any item on Day 1.
Another relevant definition has been considered in probability theory [Sch99] and more
recently in mechanism design [RW15]. The latter paper considers auctioning n items to a
buyer that has a random, “independent” monotone subadditive valuation over the items. Now
the seller knows which items she is selling them, but different types of buyers may perceive
each item differently. This is captured via an attribute of an item, which describes how each
buyer values a bundle containing this item. Formally,
Definition 2.2 (Monotone Subadditive Valuations over Independent Items [Sch99, RW15]).
We say that a distribution D over valuation functions v (·) : 2n → R is subadditive over
independent items if:
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1. All v (·) in the support of D exhibit no externalities.
Formally, let ΩS =×i∈S Ωi, where each Ωi is a compact subset of a normed space.
There exists a distribution DX over Ω[n] and functions VS : ΩS → R such that D is the
distribution that first samples X ← DX and outputs the valuation function v (·) with
v (S) = VS (〈Xi〉i∈S) for all S.
2. All v (·) in the support of D are monotone and subadditive.
3. The private information is independent across items. That is, the DX guaranteed in
Property 1 is a product distribution.
For monotone valuations, Definition 2.1 is stronger than Definition 2.2 as it assumes that the
valuation function is defined over every subset of U =
⋃
Ui, rather than just the support of
D. However, it turns out that for monotone subadditive functions Definitions 2.1 and 2.2 are
equivalent.
Observation 1. A distribution D is subadditive over independent items according to Definition
2.1 if and only if it is subadditive over independent items according to Definition 2.2.
Proof sketch. It’s easy to see that Definition 2.1 implies Definition 2.2: We can simply iden-
tify between the set of attributes Ωi on day i and the set of potential items Ui, and let
VS (〈Xi〉i∈S) , f
({Xi : i ∈ S}). Observe that the desiderata of Definition 2.2 are satisfied.
In the other direction, we again identify between each Ui and Ωi. For feasible set S which
consists of only one item in Ui for each i ∈ R, we can let XS be the corresponding vector in∏
Ωi, and define f
(
S
)
, VXS (R). Definition 2.1 requires that we define f(·) over any subset
of U ,
⋃
Ui. We do this by taking the maximum of f(·) over all feasible subsets. Namely,
for set T ⊆ U , let RT ⊆ [n] denote again the set of i’s such that |T ∩ Ui| ≥ 1. We set:
f(T ) , max
S⊆T s.t.
∀i |S∩Ui|≤1
VXS (RT ).
Now f(·) is monotone subadditive because it is maximum of monotone subadditive functions.
3 Preliminaries
3.1 Submodular and Matroid Preliminaries
A set function f : {0, 1}n → R+ is a submodular function if for all S, T ⊆ [n] it satisfies
f(S∪T )+f(S∩T ) ≤ f(S)+f(T ). For any e ∈ [n] and S ⊆ [n], let fS(e) denote f(S∪e)−f(S).
We recall some notation for to extend submodular functions from the discrete hypercube
{0, 1}n to relaxations whose domain is the continuous hypercube [0, 1]n.
For any vector x ∈ [0, 1]n, let S ∼ x denote a random set S that contains each element
i ∈ [n] independently w.p. xi. Moreover, let 1S denote a vector of length n containing 1 for
i ∈ S and 0 for i 6∈ S.
Definition 3.1. We define important continuous extensions of any set function f .
Multilinear extension F :
F (x) , ES∼x[f(S)].
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Concave closure f+:
f+(x) , max
α
{ ∑
S⊆[n]
αSf(S) |
∑
S
αS = 1 and
∑
S
αS1S = x
}
.
Continuous relaxation f∗:
f∗(x) , min
S⊆[n]
{
f(S) +
∑
i∈[n]\S
fS(e) · xi
}
.
3.1.1 Some Useful Results
Lemma 3.2 (Correlation gap [CCPV07]). For any monotone submodular function and x ∈
[0, 1]n,
F (x) ≤ f+(x) ≤ f∗(x) ≤
(
1− 1
e
)−1
F (x).
Lemma 3.3 (Lemma 2.2 of [BFNS14]). Consider any submodular function f and any set
A ⊆ [n]. Let S be a random subset of A that contains each element of S w.p. at most p (not
necessarily independently), then
ES [f(S)] ≥ (1− p) · f(∅).
Lemma 3.4 (Lemma 2.3 of [FMV11]). For any non-negative submodular function f and any
sets A,B ⊆ [n],
ES∼1A/2
T∼1B/2
[f(S ∪ T )] ≥ 1
4
(f(∅) + f(A) + f(B) + f(A ∪B)) .
Lemma 3.5 (Theorem 2.1 of [FMV11]). For any non-negative submodular function f , any
set A ⊆ [n] and p ∈ [0, 1],
F (1A · p) ≥ p(1− p) ·max
T⊆A
f(T ).
We can now prove the following useful variant of the previous two lemmata (see also an
alternative self-contained proof in Appendix A).
Lemma 3.6. Consider any non-negative submodular function f and 0 ≤ L ≤ H ≤ 1. Let S∗
be a set that maximizes f , and let x ∈ [0, 1]n be such that for all i ∈ [n], L ≤ xi ≤ H. Then,
F (x) ≥ L(1−H) · f(S∗).
Proof. Imagine a process in which in which we construct the random set T ∼ x, i.e. set T
containing each element e independently w.p. xe, in two steps. In the first step we construct
set T ′ by selecting every element independently w.p. exactly L. In the second step we
construct set T˜ containing each element e independently w.p. (xe − L)/(1 − L). It’s easy
to verify that the union of the two sets T ′ ∪ T˜ contains each element e independently with
probability exactly xe.
From Lemma 3.5, we know that at the end of first step, the generated set has expected
value E[f(T ′)] ≥ L(1−L)f(S∗). Now, we argue that the second step does not “hurt” the value
by a lot. We note that in the second step each element is added w.p. at most (H−L)/(1−L)
because xe ≤ H. Let g(S) := f(S ∪ T ′) be a non-negative submodular function. We apply
Lemma 3.3 on g to get E[g(T˜ )] ≥ (1 − H)/(1 − L) · g(∅), which implies E[f(T ′ ∪ T˜ )] ≥
(1−H)/(1− L) · E[f(T ′)].
Together, we get F (x) = E[T ′∪ T˜ ] ≥ L(1−L)(1−H)/(1−L)f(S∗) = L(1−H)f(S∗).
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3.1.2 Online Contention Resolution Schemes
Given a point x in the matroid polytope P of matroid M, many submodular maximization
applications like to select each element i independently with probability xi and claim that the
selected set S has expected value F (x) [CVZ14]. The difficulty is that S need not be feasible
in M, and we can only select T ⊆ S that is feasible. Chekuri et al. [CVZ14] introduced the
notion of contention resolution schemes (CRS) that describes how, given a random S, one
can find a feasible T ⊆ S such that the expected value f(T ) will be close to F (x).
Recently, Feldman, Svensson, and Zenklusen gave online contention resolution schemes
(OCRS). Informally, it says that the decision of whether to select element i ∈ S into T can be
made online, even before knowing the entire set S [FSZ16]. In particular, we will need their
definition of greedy OCRS; we define it below and state the results from [FSZ16] that we use
in our O(1)-submodular prophet inequality result over matroids.
Definition 3.7 (Greedy OCRS). Let x belong to a matroid polytope P and S ∼ x. A greedy
OCRS defines a downward-closed family Fx of feasible sets in the matroid. All elements reveal
one-by-one if they belong to S, and when element i ∈ [n] reveals, the greedy OCRS selects it
if, together with the already selected elements, the obtained set is in Fx.
Lemma 3.8 (Theorems 1.8 and 1.10 of [FSZ16]). Given a non-negative submodular function
f , a matroid M, and a vector x in the convex hull of independent sets in M, there exists a
deterministic greedy OCRS that outputs a set T satisfying ET [F (1T /2)] ≥ (1/16) · F (x).
3.2 Subadditive and Downward-Closed Preliminaries
A set function f : {0, 1}n → R+ is subadditive if for all S, T ⊆ [n] it satisfies f(S∪T ) ≤ f(S)+
f(T ). It’s monotone if f(S) ≤ f(T ) for any S ⊆ T . A set function f : {0, 1}n → R+ is an XOS
(alternately, fractionally subadditive) function if there exist linear functions Li : {0, 1}n → R+
such that f(S) = maxi{Li(S)}. (See Feige [Fei09] for illustrative examples.)
Lemma 3.9 ([Dob07, Lemma 3]). Any subadditive function v : 2n → R+ can be
(
log|S|
2e
)
-
approximated by an XOS function v̂ : 2n → R+; i.e. for every S ⊆ [n],
v̂ (S) ≤ v (S) ≤
(
log |S|
2e
)
v̂ (S) .
Furthermore, the XOS function has the form v̂ (S) = maxT⊆[n] pT · |T ∩ S| for an appropriate
choice of pT ’s.
Theorem 3.10 ([Rub16]). When items take values in {0, 1}, there are O (log n)-competitive
algorithms for (additive) Downward-Closed Secretary and Downward-Closed Prophet.
4 Correlation Gap for non-monotone submodular functions
For monotone submodular functions, [CCPV07] proved that
F (x) ≥ (1− 1/e)f+(x). (4.1)
This result was later rediscovered by [ADSY12], who called the ratio between f+(x) and
F (x) correlation gap. It’s useful in many applications since it says that up to a constant
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factor, picking items independently is as good as the best correlated distribution with the
same element marginals.
What is the correct generalization of (4.1) to non-monotone submodular functions? It is
tempting to conjecture that F (x) ≥ c ·f+(x) for some constant c > 0. However, the following
example shows that even for a function as simple as the directed cut function on a two-vertex
graph, this gap may be unbounded.
Example 4.1. Let f be the directed cut function on the two-vertex graph u → v; i.e.
f(∅) = 0, f({u}) = 1, f({v}) = 0, and f({u, v}) = 0. Let x = (ǫ, 1− ǫ). Then,
F (x) = ǫ2 ≪ ǫ = f+(x).
It turns out that the right way to generalize (4.1) to non-monotone submodular functions
is to first make them monotone:
Definition 4.2 (fmax).
fmax(S) , max
T⊆S
f(T ).
For non-monotone submodular f , we have that fmax is monotone, but it may no longer
be submodular, as shown by the following example:
Example 4.3 (fmax is not submodular). Let f be the directed cut function on the four-
vertex graph u → v → w → x. In particular, f({v}) = 1, f({u, v}) = 1, f({v,w}) = 1, and
f({u,w}) = 2.
fmax({u, v}) − fmax({v}) = 1− 1 < 2− 1 = fmax({u, v, w}) − fmax({v,w}).
Finally, we are ready to define correlation gap for non-monotone functions:
Definition 4.4 (Correlation gap). The correlation gap of any set function f is
max
x∈[0,1]n
max
α≥0
{
f+(x)
Fmax(x)
∣∣∣∑
S
αS = 1 and
∑
S
αS1S = x
}
,
where Fmax is the multilinear extension of fmax.
Notice that for monotone f , we have that fmax ≡ f , so Definition 4.4 generalizes the
correlation gap for monotone submodular functions. Furthermore, one could replace f+ with
f+max in Definition 4.4; observe that the resulting definition is equivalent.
Theorem 4.5 (Non-monotone correlation gap). For any (non-monotone non-negative) sub-
modular function f , the correlation gap is at most 200.
While the constant can be improved slightly, we have not tried to optimize it, focusing
instead on clarity of exposition. Our proof goes through a third relaxation, f∗1/2.
Definition 4.6 (f∗1/2). For any set function f and any x ∈ [0, 1]n,
f∗1/2(x) , min
S⊆[n]
{
ET∼1S/2
[
f(T ) +
∑
i∈[n]\S
fT (e) · xi
]}
.
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Below, we will prove (Lemma 4.7) that f+(x) ≤ 4 · f∗1/2(x). We then show (Lemma 4.9)
that f∗1/2(x) ≤ 50 · F (x/2), which implies
f+(x) ≤ 4 · f∗1/2(x) ≤ 200 · F (x/2). (4.2)
Finally, to finish the proof of Theorem 4.5, it suffices to show that F (x/2) ≤ Fmax(x).
This is easy to see since drawing T according to x/2 is equivalent to drawing S according
to x, and then throwing out each element from S independently with probability 1/2. For
Fmax(x), on the other hand, we draw the same set S and then take the optimal subset.
4.1 Proof that f+(x) ≤ 4 · f ∗1/2(x)
Lemma 4.7. For any x ∈ [0, 1]n and non-negative submodular function f : {0, 1}n → R+,
f+(x) ≤ 4 · f∗1/2(x).
We first prove the following auxiliary claim:
Claim 4.8. For any sets S, T ⊆ [n],
ET1/2∼1T /2[f((S \ T ) ∪ T1/2] ≥
1
4
f(S).
Proof. Define a new auxiliary function h(U) , f((S \ T ) ∪ U). Observe that h continues to
be non-negative and submodular. We now have,
ET1/2∼1T /2[f((S \ T ) ∪ T1/2] = ET1/2∼1T /2[h(T1/2)]
≥ 1
4
h(T ) (Lemma 3.6 for L = H = 1/2)
=
1
4
f(S) (Definition of h).
Proof of Lemma 4.7. Fix x, and let S∗ = S∗(x) denote the optimal set that satisfies f∗1/2(x) =
ET∼1S∗/2
[
f(T ) +
∑
i∈[n]\S∗ fT (e)xi
]
. Let {αS} be the optimal distribution that satisfies
f+(x) =
∑
S αSf(S). Then,
1
4f
+(x) = 14
∑
S αSf(S)
≤
∑
S
αS · ET∼1S∗/2[f((S \ S∗) ∪ T )] (Claim 4.8)
=
∑
S
αS · ET∼1S∗/2 [f(T ) + fT (S \ S∗)]
≤
∑
S
αS · ET∼1S∗/2
f(T ) + ∑
i∈S\S∗
fT (e)
 (submodularity)
= ET∼1S∗/2
f(T )∑
S
αS +
∑
S
αS
∑
i∈S\S∗
fT (e)

= ET∼1S∗/2
f(T ) + ∑
i∈[n]\S∗
fT (e)xi
 = f∗1/2(x) (using ∑
S
αS1S = x).
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4.2 Proof that f ∗1/2(x) ≤ 50 · F (x/2)
The proof of the following lemma is similar to Lemma 5 in [CCPV07].
Lemma 4.9. .
f∗1/2(x) ≤ 50 · F (x/2) .
Proof. Consider an exponential clock running for each element i ∈ [n] at rate xi. Whenever
the clock triggers, we update set S to S∪{i}. For t ∈ [0, 1], let S(t) denote the set of elements
in S by time t. Thus, each element belongs to S(1) w.p. 1 − exp(−xi), which is between
xi(1 − 1e ) and xi. Let V (t) , ET∼1S(t)/2[f(T )], i.e. expected value of set that picks each
element in S(t) independently w.p. 12 . Our goal is to show that:
f∗1/2(x) ≤
(
2
1− e−1/2
)
· E[V (1)] ≤
(
2
1− e−1/2
)(
4(e− 1)
e− 2
)
· F (x/2) . (4.3)
We begin with the second inequality of (4.3). Consider the auxiliary submodular function
g(S) , ET∼1−exp(−x)[f(S ∩ T )], and let G denote its multilinear extension. Let S∗ be a
maximizer of g, and observe that
V (1) = G(1[n]/2) ≤ g(S∗).
Observe further that, with slight abuse of notation, F (x/2) = G
(
x/2
1−exp(−x)
)
; this is well-
defined since for any xi ∈ [0, 1], we have
1
2
≤ xi/2
1− exp(−xi) ≤
e
2(e − 1) < 1.
Moreover, since xi/21−exp(−xi) is bounded, Lemma 3.6 gives
F (x/2) ≥ 1
2
·
(
1− e
2(e− 1)
)
· g(S∗) = e− 2
4(e − 1)g(S
∗) = Ω(1) · g(S∗).
We now turn to the first inequality of (4.3). Consider an infinitesimal interval interval
(t, t + dt]. For any i /∈ S(t) the exponential clock triggers with probability xi dt, so it
contributes to V (t+ dt) with probability xi/2 dt. The probability that two clocks trigger in
the same infinitesimal is negligible (O(dt2)). Therefore,
E[V (t+ dt)− V (t)] = ES(t)ET∼1S(t)/2
 ∑
j∈[n]\S
xi
2
fT (j) dt
−O(dt2)
≥ 1
2
(
f∗1/2(x)− ES(t)ET∼1S(t)/2E[f(T )]︸ ︷︷ ︸
E[V (t)]
)
dt−O(dt2).
Dividing both sides by dt and taking the limit as dt→ 0, we get:
d
dt
E[V (t)] ≥ 1
2
(
f∗1/2(x)− E[V (t)]
)
.
11
To solve the differential inequality, let φ(t) = E[V (t)] and ψ(t) = exp( t2 )φ(t). We get
dφ
dt ≥ 12(f∗1/2(x) − φ(t)) and dψdt = exp( t2)(dφdt + φ(t)2 ) ≥ exp( t2)
f∗
1/2
(x)
2 . Since ψ(0) = φ(0) = 0,
integration over t gives
E[V (t)] = φ(t) = exp(−t/2)ψ(x) ≥
f∗1/2(x)
2
(1− exp(−t/2)).
In particular, plugging in t = 1 completes the proof of the first inequality in (4.3).
5 Submodular Prophets over Matroids
Definition 5.1 (Submodular Matroid Prophet). The offline inputs to the problem are:
• n sets U1, . . . , Un; we denote their union U ,
⋃n
i=1 Ui;
• a (not necessarily monotone) non-negative submodular function f : {0, 1}U → R+;
• n distributions Di over subset Ui; and
• a matroid M over [n]
On the i-th time period, the algorithm observes an element Xi ∈ Ui drawn according to
Di, independently from outcomes and actions on past and future days. The algorithm must
decide (immediately and irrevocably) whether to add i andXi to setsW andXW , respectively,
subject to W remaining independent in M. The objective is to maximize f(XW ).
Theorem 5.2. There is a randomized algorithm with a competitive ratio of O(1) for any
Submodular Matroid Prophet
Proof overview The main ingredients in the proof of Theorem 5.2 are known online con-
tention resolution schemes (OCRS) due to Feldman, Svensson, and Zenklusen [FSZ16], and
our new bound on the correlation gap for non-monotone submodular functions (Theorem 4.5).
Let x ∈ [0, 1]U denote the vector of probabilities that each element realizes (i.e. x(i,j) =
Di(j)). A naive proof plan proceeds as follows: Select elements online using the OCRS (w.r.t
x); obtain a constant factor approximation to F (x); use a “correlation gap” to show a constant
factor approximation of f+(x); finally, observe that f+(x) is an upper bound on OPT .
There are two problems with that plan: First, the OCRS of Feldman et al. applies when
elements realize independently. The realization of different elements for the same day is
obviously correlated (exactly one element realizes), so we cannot directly apply their OCRS.
The second problem is that for non-monotone submodular function, it is in general not true
that F (x) approximates f+(x) (see Example 4.1).
The solution to both obstacles is working with x/2 instead of x. In Section 4 we showed
that F (x/2) is a constant factor approximation of f+(x) (Ineq. (4.2)). Then, in Subsection
5.1, we give an algorithm that approximates the selection of the greedy OCRS on x/2. Our
plan is then to show:
ALG = Ω(ES∼OCRS(x/2)[f(S)]) (Subsection 5.1)
= Ω(F (x/2)) (Lemma 3.8)
= Ω(f+(x)) (Ineq. (4.2))
= Ω(OPT ).
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5.1 Applying the OCRS to our setting
In this subsection we show an algorithm that obtains, in expectation, 1/2 of the expected
value of the OCRS with probabilities x/2.
Our algorithm uses the greedy OCRS as a black box. On each day, the algorithm (sequen-
tially) feeds the OCRS a subset of the elements Ui that can potentially arrive on that day.
The subset on each day is chosen at random; it is correlated with the element that actually
arrives on that day, and independent from the subsets chosen on other days. The guarantee is
that the distribution over sequences fed into the OCRS is identical to the distribution induced
by x/2.
Reduction
For each i, let Ui denote the set of elements that can arrive on day i, and fix some (arbitrary)
order over Ui. For a subset Si ⊆ Ui, let P ix/2(Si) denote the probability that the set Si is
exactly the outcome of sampling from Ui according to x/2. When element (i, j) arrives on day
i, the algorithm feeds into the OCRS a random set Ti drawn from the following distribution.
With probability
P i
x/2
({(i,j)})
xi,j
, the algorithm feeds just element (i, j), i.e. Ti = {(i, j)}; notice
that this guarantees Pr [Ti = {(i, j)}] = P ix/2({(i, j)}). Otherwise, the algorithm lets Ti be a
random subset of Ui, drawn according to x/2, conditioned on |Ti| 6= 1. This guarantees that
the probability mass on subsets of size 6= 1 is also allocated according to x/2.
Now, if the algorithm fed the singleton {(i, j)} and the OCRS selected it, then the al-
gorithm also takes {(i, j)}; otherwise the algorithm does not take {(i, j)}. (In particular, if
|Ti| 6= 1, the algorithm ignores the decisions of the OCRS.)
Analyzing the reduction
Observe that on each day the distribution over Ti’s is identical to the distribution P
i
x/2(·).
Since the Ti’s are also independent, it means that the distribution of inputs to the OCRS is
indeed distributed according to x/2.
Conditioning on (i, j) is being fed (i.e., with probability xi,j/2), P
i
x/2(·) assigns at least
1/2 probability to the event where no other element is also being fed (this is precisely the
reason we divide x by 2):
Pr[Ti = {(i, j)} | Ti ∋ (i, j)] ≥ 1/2.
Since the OCRS is greedy, for any history on days 1, . . . , i − 1, if it selects (i, j) when
observing set Ti ∋ (i, j), it would also select (i, j) when observing only this element on day
i. Furthermore, since the OCRS is only allowed to select one element on day i, conditioning
on the OCRS selecting (i, j), the future days (i+1, . . . , n) proceed independently of whether
the algorithm also selected (i, j). Therefore, conditioning on the greedy OCRS selecting any
set SOCRS, the algorithm selects a subset TALG ⊆ SOCRS where each element appears with
probability at least 1/2.
Finally, to argue that the algorithm obtains at least 1/2 of the expected value of the set
selected by the OCRS, fix the set SOCRS selected by the OCRS, and consider the submodular
function g(T¯ ) , f(SOCRS \ T¯ ). Setting T¯ , TALG \ SOCRS, we have that f(TALG) = g(T¯ ).
Thus by Lemma 3.3,
E[f(TALG)] ≥ 1
2
E[g(∅)] = 1
2
E[f(SOCRS)].
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6 Subadditive Secretary over Downward-Closed Constraints
Definition 6.1 (Monotone Subadditive Downward-Closed Secretary). Consider
n items, a monotone subadditive valuation function from subsets of items to R+, and an
arbitrary downward-closed set system F over the items; both f and F are adversarially
chosen. The algorithm receives as input n (but not F or f). The items arrive in a uniformly
random order. Initialize W as the empty set. When item i arrives, the algorithm observes all
feasible subsets of items that have already arrived, and their valuation in f . The algorithm
then decides (immediately and irrevocably) whether to add i to the set W , subject to the
constraint that W remains a feasible set in F . The goal is to maximize f(W ).
Theorem 6.2. There is a deterministic algorithm forMonotone Subadditive Downward-
Closed Secretary that achieves a competitive ratio of O
(
log n · log2 r).
Proof. Let T ⋆ be the set chosen by the offline algorithm (OPT = f(T ⋆)). By Lemma 3.9
there exists a pT ⋆ such that for every S ⊆ T ⋆:
f(S) ≥ pT ⋆ |S ∩ T ⋆| ; (6.1)
OPT = f(T ⋆) = O (pT ⋆ |T ⋆| log |T ⋆|) = O (pT ⋆ |T ⋆|) log r. (6.2)
Assume that we know pT ⋆ (discussed later). We define a new feasibility constraint F ′ as
follows: a set T ⊆ [n] is feasible in F ′ iff it is feasible in F and for every subset S ⊆ T , we
have f(S) ≥ pT ⋆ |S|. Notice that because we also force the condition on all subsets of T , F ′
is downward-closed and it does not depend on the order of arrival.
We run the algorithm for {0, 1}-valued (additive) Downward-Closed Secretary (as
guaranteed by Theorem 3.10) with feasibility constraint F ′ where all values are 1. By (6.1),
T ⋆ is feasible in F ′, and by (6.2) pT ⋆ |T ⋆| = Ω
(
OPT
log r
)
. Therefore, the additive {0, 1}-values
algorithm returns a set TALG of size
∣∣TALG∣∣ = Ω( OPTpT⋆ logn log r). Furthermore, TALG is also
feasible in F ′, i.e.
f(TALG) ≥ pT ⋆
∣∣TALG∣∣ = Ω( OPT
log n log r
)
. (6.3)
Guessing pT ⋆
Finally, we don’t actually know pT ⋆, but we can guess it correctly, up to a constant factor,
with probability 1/ log r. We run the classic secretary algorithm over the first n/2 items,
where we use the value of the singleton f({i}) as “the value of item i”: Observe the first n/4
items and select none; then take the next item whose value is larger than every item observed
so far. With constant probability this algorithm selects the item with the largest value, which
we denote by M .
Also, with constant probability the algorithm sees the item with the largest value too
early and does not select it. Assume that this is the case. Since we obtained expected value
of Ω (M) on the first n/2 items we can, without loss of generality, ignore values less thanM/r.
In particular, we know that pT ⋆ ∈ [M/r,M ]. Pick α ∈ {M/r,M/(2r), . . . ,M/2,M} uniformly
at random, and use it instead of pT ⋆ to define F ′. With probability 1/ log r, pT ⋆ ∈ [α, 2α], in
which case the algorithm returns a set TALG satisfying (6.3).
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7 Subadditive Prophet
Definition 7.1 (Monotone Subadditive Downward-Closed Prophet). The offline
inputs to the problem are:
• n sets U1, . . . , Un; we denote their union U ,
⋃n
i=1 Ui;
• a monotone non-negative subadditive function f : {0, 1}U → R+;
• n distributions Di over subset Ui; and
• a feasibility constraint F over [n].
On the i-th time period, the algorithm observes an element Xi ∈ Ui drawn according to
Di, independently from outcomes and actions on past and future days. The algorithm must
decide (immediately and irrevocably) whether to add i andXi to setsW andXW , respectively,
subject to the constraint that W remains feasible in F . The objective is to maximize f(XW ).
Let r denote the maximum cardinality of a feasible set S ∈ F .
Theorem 7.2. There is a deterministic algorithm forMonotone Subadditive Downward-
Closed Prophet that achieves a competitive ratio of O
(
log n · log2 r).
The proof of Theorem 7.2 consists of three steps: in Subsection 7.1 we reduce monotone
subadditive valuations over independent items to monotone XOS subadditive valuations over
independent items, with a loss of O (log r), using a lemma of Dobzinski [Dob07]. Then in
Subsection 7.2 we use a standard reduction from general XOS valuations to XOS with {0, 1}
marginal contributions, losing another factor of O (log r). Finally, in Subsection 7.3 we use
techniques from [Rub16] to give an O (log n)-competitive algorithm for monotone XOS with
{0, 1} marginal contributions.
7.1 Subadditive to XOS
Definition 7.3 (Monotone XOS Downward-Closed Prophet). For any set M and
items [n], the offline inputs to the problem are:
• n sets U1, . . . , Un of valuations vectors in RM+ ; we denote their union U ,
⋃n
i=1 Ui;
• a monotone XOS function f̂ : {0, 1}U → R+
f̂(S) , max
m∈M
∑
u∈S
um for S ∈ {0, 1}U ;
• n distributions Di over subset Ui; and
• a feasibility constraint F over [n], which is a collection of subsets of [n].
On the i-th time period, the algorithm observes a valuations vector Xi ∈ Ui drawn according
to Di, independently from outcomes and actions on past and future days. The algorithm
must decide (immediately and irrevocably) whether to add i and Xi to sets W and XW ,
respectively, subject to the constraint that W remains feasible in F . The objective is to
maximize f̂(XW ).
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Below (Proposition 7.4) we give an O (log n · log r)-competitive algorithm for Monotone
XOS Downward-Closed Prophet. By Dobzinski’s lemma (Lemma 3.9), this implies an
O
(
log n · log2 r)-competitive algorithm for Monotone Subadditive Downward-Closed
Prophet.
Proposition 7.4. There is a deterministic algorithm for Monotone XOS Downward-
Closed Prophet that achieves a competitive ratio of O (log n · log r).
7.2 XOS to XOS with {0, 1} coefficients
Below (Proposition 7.5), we give an O (log n)-competitive algorithm for Monotone XOS
Downward-Closed Prophet in the special case where all the vectors v ∈ U are in {0, 1}M .
First, let us show why this would imply Proposition 7.4.
Proof of Proposition 7.4 from Proposition 7.5. We recover separately the contributions from
“tail” events (a single item taking an exceptionally high value) and the “core” contribution
that is spread over many items. Run the better of the following two algorithms:
Tail Let OPT denote the expected offline optimum value. Whenever we see a feasible
item whose valuations vector Xi has value at least 2OPT , we select it. For item i, let
pi = Pr [Xi ≥ 2OPT ]. We have
OPT ≥ 2OPT · Pr [∃i : Xi ≥ 2OPT ] = 2OPT ·
(
1−
∏
(1− pi)
)
.
Dividing by OPT and rearranging, we get
1/2 ≤
∏
(1− pi) ≤ e−
∑
pi ,
and thus ∑
pi ≤ ln 2.
Therefore the probability that we want to take an item but can’t is at most ln 2, so
this algorithm achieves at least a (1− ln 2)-fraction of the expected contribution from values
greater than 2OPT .
Core Observe that we can safely ignore values less than OPT/2r, as those can contribute a
total of at mostOPT/2. Partition all remaining values into 2+log r intervals [OPT/2r,OPT/r] ,
. . . , [OPT, 2OPT ]. The expected contribution from the values in each interval is Ω (1/ log r)-
fraction of the expected offline optimum without values greater than 2OPT . Pick the interval
with the largest expected contribution, round down all the values in this interval, and run
the algorithm guaranteed by Proposition 7.5. This achieves an Ω
(
1
logn·log r
)
-fraction of the
expected contribution from values less than or equal to 2OPT .
7.3 XOS with {0, 1} coefficients
Proposition 7.5. When the Xi’s take values in {0, 1}M , there is a deterministic algorithm
for Monotone XOS Downward-Closed Prophet that achieves a competitive ratio of
O (log n).
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7.3.1 A dynamic potential function
At each iteration, the algorithm maintains a target value τ and a target probability π, where
π is the probability (over future realizations) that the current restricted prophet beats τ . We
say that an outcome (i.e. a pair of item and valuations vector) is good if selecting it does
not decrease the probability of beating the target value by a factor greater than n2, and bad
otherwise. Notice that all the bad items together contribute at most a (1/n)-fraction of the
probability of beating τ . A key ingredient is that τ is updated dynamically. If the probability
of observing a good outcome is too low (less than 1/4), we deduct 1 from τ . We show (Lemma
7.9) that this increases π by a factor of at least 2. Since π decreases by at most an n2 factor
when we select an item, and increases by a factor of 2 whenever we deduct 1 from τ : we
balance 2 log n deductions for every item the algorithm selects, and this gives the O (log n)
competitive ratio.
So far our algorithm is roughly as follows: set a target value τ ; whenever the probability
π of reaching the target τ drops below 1/4, decrease τ ; if π > 1/4, sit and wait for a good
outcome - one will arrive with probability at least 1/4 (we actually do this with Pr[A] instead
of π, where A is a closely related event). There is one more subtlety: what should the
algorithm do if no good outcomes arrive? In other words, what if the probability of observing
a good outcome is neither very low nor very close to 1, say 1/2 or even 1− 1logn? On one hand,
we can’t decrease τ again, because we are no longer guaranteed a significant increase in π; on
the other hand, after, say Θ
(
log2 n
)
iterations, we still have a high probability of having an
iteration where none of the good outcomes arrive. (If no good outcomes are coming, we don’t
want the algorithm to wait forever...) Fortunately, there is a simple solution: the algorithm
waits for the last item with a good outcome in its support; if, against the odds, no good
outcomes have yet been observed, the algorithm “hallucinates” that this last item has a good
valuations vector, and selects it. In expectation, at most a constant fraction of the items we
select are “hallucinated”, so the competitive ratio is still O (log n).
7.3.2 Notation
We let OPT denote the expected (offline) optimum. W is the set of items selected so far (W
for “Wins”), and ℓW , max {i ∈W} is the index of the last selected item.
Let F denote the family of all feasible subsets of [n]. For any T ⊆ [n], let FT denote the
family of feasible sets whose intersection with {1, . . . ,max (T )} is exactly T .
Let Xi = (X
m
i )m∈M ∈ {0, 1}M denote the random vector drawn for the i-th item. We use
zi to refer to the observed realization of Xi. Our algorithm will maintain a subset M
′ ⊆ M .
We let
VM ′
(F ,X[n]) , max
S∈F
max
m∈M ′
∑
i∈S
(Xi)m
denote the value of optimum offline solution (note that this is also a random variable).
Let τ = τ (W ) be the current target value, and π = π (τ,W ) denotes the current target
probability:
π (τ,W ) , Pr
[
VM ′
(
FW ,X[n]
)
> τ | X[ℓW ] = z[ℓW ]
]
.
For each yj ∈ supp
(
Xj
)
, we define πj,yj = πj,yj (τ,W ) to be the probability of reaching τ ,
given that:
• zj = yj,
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• j is the next item we select, and
• item j actually contributes 1 to the offline optimum.
Formally,
πj,yj (τ,W ) , Pr
[
VM ′∩yj
(FW+j ,X[n]) > τ | X[ℓW ]∪[j] = (z[ℓW ], yj)] ,
where we slightly abuse notation and also use yj to denote the set of m ∈M such that ymj = 1.
We say that a future outcome (j, yj) is good if π
j,yj ≥ n−2·π and j is feasible (and otherwise
it is bad), and let G = {good (j, yj)} denote the set of good future outcomes. Finally,
A , A (π, τ,W ) ,
is the event that at least one of the good outcomes occur.
7.3.3 Updated proof plan and the algorithm
The idea is to always maintain a threshold τ such that probability of one of the good outcomes
to occur is large, i.e. Pr[A] is at least a constant 14 . The way we do this is by showing in
Claim 7.6 that at any time during the execution of the algorithm, conditioned on what all has
happened till now, the probability π that the offline algorithm achieves the threshold τ gives
a lower bound on Pr[A]. Hence, whenever Pr[A] goes below 14 , we decrease the threshold τ ,
which increases π due to Lemma 7.9 and, indirectly, increases Pr[A] by Claim 7.6.
Initialize τ ← OPT/2, M ′ ← M , and W ← ∅. Lemma 7.8 uses a concentration bound
due to Ledoux to show that in the beginning τ = OPT/2 satisfies π > 14 .
After each update to W , decrease τ until Pr [A] ≥ 1/4, or until |W | > τ . When Pr [A] ≥
1/4, reveal the values of items until observing a good outcome. When we observe a good
outcome zj , add j to W and restrict M
′ to its intersection with zj . Since we restrict M to
M ′, this gives us that at any time
VM ′ (F ,XW ) = |W |.
If we reach the last item with good outcomes in its support, and none of the good outcomes
realize, add this last item to G and subtract 1 from τ (without modifying M ′). See also
pseudocode in Algorithm 1.
We first claim that π gives us a lower bound on Pr[A] because most of the mass in π
comes from good outcomes.
Claim 7.6. At any point during the run of the algorithm,
Pr[A (π, τ,W )] ≥
(
1− 1
n
)
π(W, τ).
Proof. For each (j, yj) /∈ G, we have, by definition of G,
πj,yj (W, τ) < n−2 · π (W, τ) .
Summing over all (j, yj) /∈ G,
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Algorithm 1 Prophet
1. τ ← OPT2 ; M ′ ←M ; W ← ∅
2. while τ > |W |:
(a) π ← Pr [VM ′ (FW ,X[n]) > τ | X[ℓW ] = z[ℓW ]]
# π is the probability that, given the history, the offline optimum can still beat τ .
(b) G← {(j, yj) : j > ℓW AND πj,yj ≥ n−2 · π} ∩ (⋃S∈FW S)
# G is the set of good and feasible outcomes.
(c) if Pr [A] ≥ 1/4
# A good outcome is likely occur.
i. j∗ ← min {j ∈ G : (j, zj) ∈ G}
# Wait for a good and feasible outcome.
ii. if j∗ =∞
# No good outcomes.
A. j∗ ← maxG
# Select the last potentially good item.
B. τ ← τ − 1
# Adjust the target value to account for select an item with value 0
iii. else
# j∗ is actually a good item.
A. M ′ ←M ′ ∩ zj
iv. W ←W ∪ {j∗}
(d) else
i. τ ← τ − 1
# decrease target value τ until Pr [A] ≥ 1/4.
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∑
j
∑
yj :(j,yj)/∈G
Pr [yj] · πj,yj (W, τ) ≤
∑
j
∑
yj :(j,yj)/∈G
Pr [yj] ·
(
n−2 · π (W, τ))
≤
∑
j
n−2 · π (W, τ)
≤ n−1 · π (W, τ) .
Thus, most of π comes from good (j, yj)’s:
Pr[A] =
∑
j
∑
yj :(j,yj)∈G
Pr [yj] · πj,yj (W, τ) ≥ (1− 1/n) π (W, τ) . (7.1)
7.3.4 Concentration for the beginning
Theorem 7.7. [Led97, Theorem 2.4] There exists some constant K > 0 such that the fol-
lowing holds. Let Yi’s be independent (but not necessarily identical) random variables in
some space S; let C be a countable class of measurable functions f : S → [0, 1]; and let
Z = supf∈C
∑n
i=1 f (Yi). Then,
Pr [Z ≥ E [Z] + t] ≤ exp
(
− t
K
· log
(
1 +
t
E [Z]
))
.
To make the connection to our setting, let Yi be the vector in [0, 1]
F×M whose (S,m)-th
coordinate is Xmi if i ∈ S, and 0 otherwise. Let fS,m (Yi) , [Yi]S,m, so
∑n
i=1 fS,m (Yi) is simply
the value of the set S under the m-th summation in the XOS representation of the valuation
function. Let C , {fS}S∈F . The above concentration inequality can now be written as
Pr
[
V
(F ,X[n]) ≥ OPT + t] ≤ exp(− tK · log
(
1 +
t
OPT
))
. (7.2)
Lemma 7.8. Assume OPT ≥ Ω (log n). Then,
Pr
[
V
(F ,X[n]) ≥ OPT2
]
> 1/4.
Proof. We have,
OPT =
ˆ ∞
−OPT
Pr
[
V
(F ,X[n]) ≥ OPT + t] dt, (7.3)
which can be decomposed as to integrals over [−OPT,−OPT/2], [−OPT/2, OPT ], and
[OPT,∞].
The first two integrals can be easily bounded as
ˆ −OPT/2
−OPT
Pr
[
V
(F ,X[n]) ≥ OPT + t] dt ≤ ˆ −OPT/2
−OPT
1 · dt ≤ OPT
2
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and
ˆ OPT
−OPT/2
Pr
[
V
(F ,X[n]) ≥ OPT + t] dt ≤ ˆ OPT
−OPT/2
Pr
[
V
(F ,X[n]) ≥ OPT/2] dt
≤ 3OPT
2
· Pr
[
V
(F ,X[n]) > OPT2
]
.
For the third integral we use the concentration bound (7.2):
ˆ ∞
OPT
Pr
[
V
(F ,X[n]) ≥ OPT + t] dt ≤ ˆ ∞
OPT
exp
(
− t
K
· log
(
1 +
t
OPT
))
dt
≤
ˆ ∞
OPT
exp
(
− t
K
)
dt
=
[
Ke−t/K
]∞
OPT
= K · e−OPT/K ,
which is negligible since OPT = ω (1).
Plugging into (7.3), we have:
OPT ≤ OPT
2
+
3OPT
2
· Pr
[
V
(F ,X[n]) > OPT2
]
+ o (1) ,
and after rearranging we get
Pr
[
V
(F ,X[n]) > OPT2
]
≥ 1/3− o (1) .
7.3.5 Main lemma
Lemma 7.9. At any point during the run of the algorithm, if Pr [A] ≤ 1/4, then subtracting
1 from τ doubles π; i.e.
π (W, τ − 1) ≥ 2π (W, τ) .
Proof of Lemma 7.9. Consider the event that the optimum solution (conditioned on the items
W we already selected and the realizations z[ℓW ] we have already seen) reaches τ . We can
write it as a union of disjoint events, depending on the next item j > ℓW that is part of the
optimum solution, and its possible realizations yj:
π (W, τ) =
∑
j
∑
yj
Pr [yj ] · Pr
[
VM ′∩yj
(FW∪{j},X[n]) > τ | X[ℓW ]∪[j] = (z[ℓW ], yj)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
πj,yj (W,τ)
.
We break the RHS into the sum over (j, yj)’s that are good and the sum over those that are
bad. Now, Claim 7.6 gives∑
j
∑
yj :(j,yj)∈G
Pr [yj] · πj,yj (W, τ) ≥ (1− 1/n) π (W, τ) . (7.4)
Since yj ∈ {0, 1}M , each item can contribute at most 1 to the offline optimum. Therefore:
21
Pr
[
VM ′∩yj
(FW∪{j},X[n]) > τ | X[ℓW ]∪[j] = (z[ℓW ], yj)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
πj,yj=πj,yj (τ,W )
≤ πj,0 (W, τ − 1)
Plugging into (7.4), we have
(1− 1/n) π (W, τ) ≤
∑
j
∑
yj :(j,yj)∈G
Pr [yj] · πj,0 (W, τ − 1)
≤
∑
j
Pr [(j, yj) ∈ G] · πj,0 (W, τ − 1)
≤
∑
j
Pr [(j, yj) ∈ G]
 · π (W, τ − 1) , (7.5)
where the second inequality follows because πj,0 (W, τ − 1) doesn’t depend on yj, and the
third because conditioning on the j-th item being 0 can only decrease the probability of
reaching τ − 1.
Recall that A is the union of all the events (j, yj) ∈ G. Therefore,
Pr [A] ≥
∑
j
Pr [(j, yj) ∈ G] (1− Pr [A])
Plugging in Pr [A] < 1/4, we get that
∑
j Pr [(j, yj) ∈ G] < 1/3. Plugging into (7.5) and
rearranging, we get
π (W, τ − 1) ≥ 3n
n− 1π (W, τ) .
7.3.6 Putting it all together
Lemma 7.10. At any point during the run of the algorithm,
τ ≥ OPT
2
− (2 log n+ 1) · |W | − 2
Proof. We prove by induction that at any point during the run of the algorithm,
log π ≥ −2− (2 log n+ 1) · |W |+
(
OPT
2
− τ
)
. (7.6)
After initialization, log π ≥ −2 by Lemma 7.8. By definition of G, whenever we add an item
toW , we decrease log π by at most 2 log n - hence the 2 log n · |W | term. Notice that when the
algorithm “hallucinates” a 1, we also decrease τ by 1 to correct for the hallucination - at any
point during the run of the algorithm, this has happened at most |W | times. Recall that we
may also decrease τ in the last line of Algorithm 1 (in order to increase π); whenever we do
this, τ decreases by 1, but π doubles (by Lemma 7.9), so log π increases by 1, and Inequality
(7.6) is preserved.
Finally, since π is a probability, we always maintain log π ≤ 0.
We are now ready to complete the proof of Theorem 7.2.
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Proof of Proposition 7.5. The algorithm always terminates after at most O (OPT ) decreases
to the value of τ . By Lemma 7.10, when the algorithm terminates, we have |W | ≥ τ ≥
OPT
2 − (2 log n+ 1) · |W | − 2, and therefore in particular |W | ≥ OPT−44 logn+4 .
Finally, recall that sometimes the algorithm “hallucinates” good realizations, i.e. for some
items i ∈ W that we select, Xi = 0. However, each time we add an item, the probability
that we add a zero-value item is at most 3/4 (by the condition Pr [A] > 1/4). Therefore in
expectation the value of the algorithm is at least |W | /4.
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A Missing Proofs
Lemma 3.6. Consider any submodular function f and L,H ∈ [0, 1]. Let S∗ be a set that
maximizes f , and let x ∈ [0, 1]n such that for all i ∈ [n], L ≤ xi ≤ H. Then,
F (x) ≥ (1−H)(1 − L)f(∅) + (1−H)L · f(S∗)
Proof. Assume, wlog, that S∗ = {1, . . . , k}. By submodularity, at each step after we add
another element, the potential marginal gain of all other elements decreases. In particular,
if we add the elements in S∗ in any order, they all have non-negative marginal contribution
(since each has a non-negative marginal contribution when added last).
Let x≤i denote the restriction of x to [i]. We first show by induction that for every i ≤ k,
F (x≤i) ≥ (1− L)f(∅) + L · f([i]). Denote Si , S ∩ [i]. We have that F (x≤i) is at least:
ES∼x
[
f(Si)
]
≥ ES∼x
[
f(Si−1) + f(Si ∪ [i− 1])− f([i− 1])
]
(Submodularity)
= F (x≤i−1) + ES∼x
[
f(Si ∪ [i− 1])− f([i− 1])
]
≥ F (x≤i−1) + xi
(
f([i])− f([i− 1])
)
(Submodularity)
≥ F (x≤i−1) + L
(
f([i])− f([i− 1])
)
(f([i]) − f([i− 1]) ≥ 0).
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Finally by the induction hypothesis, F (x≤i−1) ≥ (1 − L)f(∅) + L · f([i − 1]). In particular,
we now have that
F (x≤k) ≥ (1− L)f(∅) + L · f(S∗).
It is left to argue that the rest of the elements do not hurt the value too much. Consider
any Si ⊆ S∗, and let B∗ = B∗(Sk) = {k+1, . . . , ℓ} be the worst set that we could add to Sk,
i.e. the B that minimizes f(Sk ∪ B). Let Bj , {k + 1, . . . , ℓ} ⊆ B∗, and let Tj denote the
intersection of Bj with a set T ⊆ T ∗ sampled according to x. Now consider two options for
adding elements from T ∗ to Sk:
1. deterministically, or
2. independently at random with probabilities sampled according to x.
Since f is non-negative, we have that even when we add all the bad elements deterministically,∑
f(Sk ∪Bj)− f(Sk ∪Bj−1) = f(Sk ∪B∗)− f(Sk) ≥ −f(Sk). (A.1)
When we add the elements at random, we have (by submodularity) that the marginal contri-
bution of each bad element can only increase compared to its contribution in the first case.
Therefore,
ET [f(Sk ∪ T )− f(Sk)] =
∑
ET [f(Sk ∪ Tj)− f(Sk ∪ Tj−1)]
≥
∑
xj (f(Sk ∪Bj)− f(Sk ∪Bj−1)) (Submodularity)
≥
∑
H (f(Sk ∪Bj)− f(Sk ∪Bj−1)) (f(Sk ∪Bj)− f(Sk ∪Bj−1) ≤ 0)
≥ −Hf(Sk) (Inequality (A.1)).
So far we have ET [f(Sk ∪ T )] ≥ (1 −H)f(Sk). Finally, the marginal contribution of the
remaining elments {ℓ + 1, . . . , n} is non-negative by submodularity (if it were negative, we
could get a worse set B′). Therefore, for every Sk, adding the rest of the elements can decrease
the value by at most a factor of 1−H.
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